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Abstract 
Point estimates of agricultural and trade policy impacts often paint an incomplete or even 
misleading picture.  For many purposes it is important to estimate a distribution of 
outcomes.  Stochastic modeling can be especially important when policies have 
asymmetric effects or when there is interest in the tails of distributions.  Both of these 
factors are important in evaluating World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments on 
internal support measures.  Point estimates based on a continuation of 2005 U.S. 
agricultural policies and average values for external factors indicate that U.S. support 
would remain well below agreed commitments under the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA).  Stochastic estimates indicate that the mean value of the U.S. 
Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) is substantially greater than the deterministic point 
estimate.  In 41.8 percent of 500 stochastic outcomes, the URAA AMS limit is exceeded 
at least once between 2006 and 2014.   
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 A traditional deterministic model of agricultural markets is not always the right 
tool to use in examining policy issues.  Point estimates of policy impacts often fail to tell 
the whole story and sometimes may lead to inappropriate conclusions.  At least for some 
questions, a stochastic model can be a more useful tool.  Stochastic analysis can be 
particularly useful when policies have asymmetric consequences or when there is 
intrinsic interest in the tails of distributions. 
 U.S. agricultural policies provide many examples of asymmetries that increase the 
value of stochastic analysis.  Consider, for example, the operation of the marketing loan 
program for U.S. grains, oilseeds, and cotton.  Producers qualify for loan program 
benefits when market price indicators (posted county prices in the case of grains and 
soybeans, adjusted world prices for cotton and rice) fall below the government-specified 
loan rate.   
 Suppose that deterministic analysis generates point estimates of future prices that 
slightly exceed the levels that would trigger marketing loan benefits.   Estimated 
government expenditures on the marketing loan program would be zero.  Stochastic 
analysis, in contrast, would recognize that supply and demand uncertainty makes it more 
appropriate to consider a distribution of market prices rather than just a point estimate.   
In most of the possible market outcomes, prices would exceed the level triggering loan 
program benefits and marketing loan expenditures would be zero, but in some outcomes, 
prices would be low enough to result in marketing loan benefits.  The average value of 
marketing loan benefits over all the stochastic outcomes, therefore, can be greater than 
zero even when marketing loan benefits at the average value of market prices would be 
zero. 
 The asymmetry of U.S. government farm programs has important implications 
when estimating taxpayer costs.  Projections prepared in early 2005 by the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) indicate that the deterministic estimate for 
U.S. government farm program expenditures is more than $3 billion per year lower than 
the mean of 500 possible outcomes from stochastic analysis of the same baseline (FAPRI 
2005b).  The deterministic and stochastic estimates differ primarily because of large 
differences in the estimated cost of the marketing loan program, and not because of any 
significant difference between deterministic point estimates of prices and the mean prices 
estimated in the stochastic analysis. 
 From a policy perspective, sometimes the interesting part of a distribution is not 
the mean, median, or mode, but rather one of the tails.  Policy makers may be more 
concerned with how a policy impacts farm income or government spending in a “bad” 
year than they are with effects under “normal” conditions.  For example, analysis that 
considers the effects of crop insurance programs assuming average levels of yields and 
prices is likely to miss the true market and policy significance of the program. 
 Current World Trade Organization (WTO) rules also create a situation where it is 
important to focus on tails of distributions.  Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA), countries agreed to limit their total current Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS), an indicator of government support that is coupled to production 
decisions (WTO 1994).  In the case of the United States, marketing loan expenditures 
account for much of the AMS.  Because marketing loan expenditures depend on market 
prices, they are inherently variable.  As a result, a given set of farm policies may leave 
the United States in compliance with its WTO commitments when prices are at average 
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or above-average levels, but might put the country out of compliance when prices are 
sufficiently low. 
 The paper will discuss the development of stochastic estimates of the U.S. current 
AMS.  Both deterministic and stochastic analyses will indicate that U.S. support to 
producers is expected to be considerably below the current AMS limit established by the 
URAA under the reporting practices that have been followed by the U.S. government.  
However, examination of the stochastic results indicates that there is some non-zero 
probability that the United States could breach the URAA limits. 
 These analytical issues have important implications for evaluation of a possible 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) agreement.  Anderson, Martin, and van der 
Mensbrugge (2005) indicated that they generally had to assume large reductions in bound 
levels of AMS before the hypothetical commitments would become binding and affect 
estimated market outcomes.  Such an assumption was necessary because their 
deterministic analysis started from a baseline where actual AMS levels in the United 
States and most other countries were well within their URAA obligations.  This paper 
will show that even when point estimates suggest that existing limits are not binding, 
reductions in AMS limits increase the probability that limits will be reached or exceeded. 
The remaining sections of the paper provide a brief description of the stochastic model 
equations, the process used to generate stochastic estimates, a discussion of the results, 
and some concluding remarks. 
 
The Stochastic Model  
 The FAPRI stochastic model of the U.S. agricultural economy represents an 
outgrowth of FAPRI’s deterministic model of world agricultural markets.  The FAPRI 
deterministic world model is a multimarket, nonspatial, partial equilibrium model that has 
increased in scope and complexity since the early 1980s.  The deterministic model covers 
markets for major grains (wheat, corn, rice, sorghum, barley, and oats), oilseeds, 
(soybeans, rapeseed, sunflowerseed, peanuts, and palm oil), cotton, sugar, beef, pork, 
poultry, and dairy products.  Country coverage varies by commodity, but generally 
includes the United States, the European Union, China, India, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, 
Canada, Australia, and other major exporters and importers of each commodity.  The 
deterministic model is used to generate annual 10-year baseline projections (e.g., FAPRI 
2005a) and analyze a wide range of domestic and trade policy questions (e.g., Fabiosa et 
al. 2005). 
As it became clear that a deterministic model was inadequate for addressing some 
of the questions posed by policy makers, work began in 2000 on a stochastic version of 
the model.  To keep the scale of the effort manageable, the stochastic model focuses on 
U.S. markets and is less detailed than its deterministic counterpart.  World markets are 
represented by single reduced form equations, and some of the regional detail included in 
the U.S. portion of the deterministic model is replaced by national supply equations.  
Even so, the stochastic model has approximately 1,000 equations representing U.S. crop 
and livestock supply, demand, trade, and prices, as well as aggregate indicators such as 
government farm program costs, net farm income, agricultural land values, and consumer 
food price indices (FAPRI 2005e). 
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The crop portion of the model includes behavioral equations that determine crop 
acreage planted, domestic feed, food and industrial uses, trade, and ending stocks.  On the 
livestock side of the model, behavioral equations determine animal inventories, meat, 
milk and dairy product production, consumption, and, where appropriate, ending stocks 
and trade.  The model solves for the set of prices that brings annual supply and demand 
into balance in all markets. 
Of particular interest to the present study are the equations that determine crop 
supply.  The national planted area equations in the stochastic model approximate the 
aggregate behavior of the regional crop supply equations in the deterministic model.  
Planted area (APL) for each crop depends on per-acre expected supply-inducing net 
returns (ESINR) for the crop in question and competing crops, a weighted average of per-
acre decoupled payments for all crops (DECP) and conservation reserve program acreage 
(CRP): 
 
 APLi = f( ESINR1, ESINR2, ESINR3…ESINR10, DECP, CRP).   (1) 
 
The synthetic parameters of the model reflect standard relationships between 
supply and expected returns.  Acreage increases with own expected returns, declines 
when there is an increase in expected competing crop returns, and the own-return 
elasticity is generally slightly larger than the absolute value of the sum of competing crop 
return elasticities.  Given model parameters, a 1 percent increase in expected supply-
inducing net returns for all modeled crops would increase the total land planted to 
modeled crops by 0.06 percent.  Decoupled payments, defined as the weighted sum of 
direct payments and expected counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) for all crops, have only 
a small effect on planted area, with elasticities less than 0.02.  In a survey of empirical 
work, Abler and Blandford (2004) found that estimated acreage impacts of production 
flexibility contract payments and market loss assistance payments (the precursors to 
direct payments and CCPs) were generally modest.  The coefficients on the CRP variable 
in each equation suggest that a 1 acre increase in CRP area would reduce the area planted 
to the modeled crops by less than half an acre. 
Expected supply-inducing net returns are a function of trend yields (TYLD), 
expected prices (EPR), expected variable production expenses per acre (VEX), expected 
marketing loan program benefits (EMLB), and expected CCPs (ECCP): 
 
 ESINR = EPR*TYLD – VEX + EMLB + 0.25*ECCP. (2) 
 
The specification includes both market returns and marketing loan benefits that 
can only be earned by producing a crop, and assumes that producers value a dollar of 
expected returns from the market the same as a dollar of expected marketing loan 
benefits.  Also included are 25 percent of expected CCPs.  Because CCPs are made on a 
fixed base, they can be considered at least partially decoupled from production decisions 
(thus their inclusion in the decoupled payment term in the area equations).  However, 
CCPs do depend on prices, and risk-averse producers may have a positive supply 
response to the price insurance offered by the program.  The 0.25 parameter is based on 
analyst judgment, reflecting the notion that the crop-specific effect of CCPs on 
production is likely to be positive, but modest.  Because expected CCPs are included in 
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the definition of expected supply-inducing net returns for all crops, an across-the-board 
increase or decrease in CCPs would have only a small impact on production, given both 
the 0.25 parameter and the small response of total crop area to proportional changes in all 
crop returns.  A disproportionate decrease in expected CCPs for any one crop, however, 
would have more noticeable impacts, decreasing acreage for the crop in question but 
generally increasing acreage for competing crops, given model parameters. 
Expected prices depend on the lagged price (PRt-1) and the ratio of lagged yields 
(YLDt-1) to the trend yield: 
 
 EPR = f(PR t-1,  YLDt-1/TYLD). (3) 
 
 The equation parameters are based on an estimation of the proportional year-over-
year change in prices as a function of the change in yields.  When yields in t-1 were 
unusually high (low), farmers are assumed to expect that prices in t will be higher (lower) 
than they were in t-1.  While this is only a minor step toward a model assuming more 
rational expectations, it has important implications for how the model behaves in 
abnormal years.  For example, in 2003 corn yields were at then-record levels while 
soybean yields were well below normal.   Relative to 2002/03 levels, soybean prices 
increased sharply in 2003/04, while corn prices remained near the previous year’s level.  
A naïve expectations approach would have generated a large increase in soybean acreage 
in 2004 at the expense of corn, given the change in relative prices in 2003/04.  However, 
given the expected price formulation used in the model, the below-average soybean yield 
in 2003 offset part of the increase in 2003/04 prices, so the model expected soybean price 
for 2004/05 was noticeably lower than the 2003/04 actual price.  The net result was a 
model estimate that both corn and soybean acreage would increase in 2004, consistent 
with observed market results. 
Expected marketing loan benefits depend on the loan rate (LR), expected prices, 
an assumed wedge (MLBW), and the trend yield: 
 
 EMLB = max(0, LR – EPR + MLBW) * TYLD. (4) 
 
The wedge variable reflects observed historical differences in per-unit marketing 
loan benefits (loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains divided by production) 
and a simple comparison of loan rates and market prices.  For example, corn marketing 
loan benefits averaged $0.20 per bushel more than the difference between the corn loan 
rate and the corn market price between 1998/99 and 2001/02, the last extended period 
when loan program benefits were available (calculations based on USDA reported 
production and loan program data).  The corn EMLB equation, therefore, assumes 
MLBW is equal to $0.20 per bushel.  Two factors contributing to the positive wedge are 
seasonality in prices (producers may take their marketing loan benefits when prices are 
below season average levels and payment rates are high), and the observed fact that the 
average of posted county prices used to calculate loan program benefits tends to be lower 
than the national average market price.  While the actual relationship between marketing 
loan benefits and market prices may be more complicated than suggested by the model 
specification, it is clear that marketing loan benefits can and do occur when season-
average market prices exceed the loan rate. 
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Finally, the expected CCP depends on the target price (TP), the direct payment 
rate (DP), expected price, loan rate, fixed CCP program yield (CCPY), and a 0.85 factor 
established by law: 
 
  ECCP = max(0, TP - DP - max(EPR, LR)) * CCPY * 0.85. (5) 
 
Considering the set of model supply equations, supply response can be very 
different depending on the level of market prices.  Model supply elasticities with respect 
to expected market prices are zero when prices are below the loan rate, and they reach 
their maximum value only when expected market prices exceed the target price minus the 
direct payment rate (i.e., the level where an increase in prices no longer has a negative 
effect on government payments). 
Asymmetries of government policies and the resulting differences in model 
supply response at different prices have proven important in analyses of various policy 
scenarios.  Tighter limitations on payments available to any one producer were found to 
have little effect on crop supplies, government costs, or farm income when prices were 
above average, but much larger impacts at lower price levels (FAPRI 2003).  Likewise, 
the limitation on marketing loan program benefits proposed in the President’s budget for 
fiscal year 2006 was found to have much larger effects on production, government costs, 
and farm income when prices were low than when prices were high (FAPRI 2005c).  
Finally, an analysis of the impacts of increased ethanol production indicated that at low 
baseline levels of U.S. corn prices, increased corn demand would increase prices and 
reduce government payments to corn producers, but would have little impact on corn 
production or farm income.  At higher baseline corn prices, there would be no 
government payment offset when increased demand results in higher market prices, and 
the result would be increased corn producer income and a much larger increase in corn 
production (FAPRI 2005d). 
Space constraints do not permit a full description of the other behavioral 
equations in the model.  Per-capita human consumption equations are generally functions 
of prices and income levels.  Processing industry demand for raw commodities (e.g., 
soybean crush, corn processing for ethanol and high-fructose corn syrup) depends on 
endogenous processing margins.  Derived demand for feed is a function of livestock 
sector indicators and feed prices.  Beef and pork production depends in part on animal 
inventories, which in turn depend on dynamic investment behavior.  Productivity 
measures such as milk per cow and livestock slaughter weights depend on output prices, 
production costs, and technological change.  Stock demand equations reflect speculative 
and other motives for holding stocks, and incorporate provisions of government price 
support programs as appropriate. 
The representation of U.S. agricultural commodity trade in the stochastic model is 
greatly simplified relative to the large non-spatial model FAPRI utilizes to generate 
deterministic projections.  Single reduced-form equations take the place of the thousands 
of equations underlying the world models.  For example, U.S. corn exports (COREX) are 
a function of a lagged dependent variable, current prices of corn (CORPR), wheat 
(WHEPR), sorghum (SORPR), barley (BARPR), and soybean meal (SOMPR), lagged 
prices of soybeans (SOYPR), and the level of oats net imports (OATIM): 
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COREX = f(lag(COREX), CORPR, WHEPR, SORPR, BARPR, SOMPR,  
 lag(SOYPR), OATIM). (6) 
 
Coefficients for the reduced form trade equations are set so that the equations 
generally mimic the behavior of a global system.  In the case of corn, for example, the 
reduced form equation suggests an own-price elasticity of U.S. export demand of about   
-1.03 in the short run and about -2.58 in the long run, with positive elasticities with 
respect to the other crop prices.  This approach to modeling trade may be satisfactory 
when modeling U.S. policy changes, but it does not lend itself to analysis of multilateral 
policy changes.  For example, the current U.S. stochastic framework would require 
significant modification before it could be used to analyze the impact of an international 
trade agreement that might systematically change the price responsiveness of export 
demand. 
The model includes a large set of equations that permit estimation of fiscal year 
government farm program outlays and calendar year net farm income.  While it is easy to 
dismiss these portions of the model as mere accounting, a number of challenges are faced 
in reconciling crop, calendar, and fiscal year data and in reproducing the detail expected 
by policy makers in the appropriate format. 
Added to the model for the present analysis is a series of equations to estimate the 
current AMS and other indicators related to WTO internal support issues.  The equations 
are intended to reflect the accounting practices used by the United States in preparing its 
WTO submissions (the most recent available at the time of this writing covers the 2001 
marketing year), but can easily be modified to reflect other rules and practices.  Because 
the focus is on amber box support subject to limitation under the WTO agreement, no 
effort is made to estimate support the United States has treated as green box support in its 
submissions.  For example, the current AMS estimates to do not include payments made 
under the U.S. direct payment program, even though the WTO status of those payments 
is in question at the time of this writing because of the WTO appellate body report on the 
Brazilian cotton case (WTO Appellate Body 2005). 
Most of the accounting to generate AMS estimates is straightforward, given 
estimates generated by other model equations.  For example, the main components of the 
calculated AMS for most major field crops are various benefits available under the 
marketing loan program.  For most crops, the calculated AMS (CALCAMS) is simply the 
sum of crop year LDPs (CYLDP) and marketing loan gains (CYMLG) and a proxy for 
interest rate subsidies on commodity loans (an assumed subsidy rate multiplied by the 
value of loans made, (LOANSUB*VALLOAN): 
 
  CALCAMS = CYLDP + CYMLG + (LOANSUB*VALLOAN). (7) 
 
A different set of calculations are required for sugar and dairy, where the 
calculated AMS is primarily comprised of the calculated value to producers of a price 
support program that maintains domestic prices above those that prevailed in world 
markets between 1986 and 1988.  The price support component of the AMS for these two 
commodities is equal to the product of the quantity produced (PROD) and the difference 
between the price support level (PRISUP) and the fixed 1986-1988 world reference price 
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(PRIREF).  The calculated AMS also includes any coupled direct payments (COUPAY), 
such as those under the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program:  
 
  CALCAMS = (PRISUP-PRIREF) * PROD + COUPAY.  (8) 
 
The current AMS for each commodity (CURRAMS) is equal to the calculated 
AMS unless the calculated AMS is less than 5 percent of the value of production (price 
multiplied by production).  If the calculated AMS for a given commodity is less than 5 
percent of its value of production, the current AMS for that commodity is set equal to 
zero, as allowed by the de minimis rule in the URAA. 
In its WTO submissions through crop year 2001, the United States classified crop 
insurance and market loss assistance payments as nonproduct-specific support (Economic 
Research Service 2005).  Although the Brazilian cotton case raises questions about the 
appropriate classification of these programs, the analysis here assumes that crop 
insurance and counter-cyclical payments (which some consider a successor to market loss 
assistance payments, although the payment rules differ in several aspects) are classified 
as nonproduct-specific amber box support measures.  
Estimates of counter-cyclical payments are generated by existing model 
equations.  New to the system are equations used to estimate the contribution of crop 
insurance to AMS measures.  Crop insurance net indemnities depend on the mix of crop 
insurance policies in force, actual and projected market prices, and crop yields at the unit 
level (farms are often divided into multiple units for crop insurance purposes).  As such, 
it is very difficult to project crop insurance activity based solely on the aggregate U.S. 
variables estimated in other components of the stochastic model.    
The crop insurance stochastic estimates are derived from the results of the FAPRI 
deterministic crop insurance baseline and the ratios of stochastic draws to the 
deterministic FAPRI baseline figures for crop acreage, crop yields, and crop prices. For 
the analysis, estimates for both yield and revenue insurance policies are developed for 
corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, rice, sorghum, barley, and oats, and all other commodities 
are handled as a single aggregate.  
Insurance premiums and premium subsidies vary with crop acreage.  Loss ratios 
(the ratio of insurance indemnities to insurance premiums) are computed for the various 
crops and insurance policies. For yield insurance, the loss ratios depend on the ratio of 
the stochastic yield draw to the deterministic yield; low stochastic yield draws translate 
into high yield insurance loss ratios and higher than average yield insurance indemnities. 
For revenue insurance, the loss ratios depend on the ratio of the stochastic yield draw to 
the deterministic yield and the ratio of the stochastic price draw to the expected price. For 
the crop insurance simulations, the expected price is defined as the average of the 
stochastic price draw for the previous year and the deterministic price for the current 
year. The combination of low stochastic yield and/or price draws translates into higher 
revenue insurance loss ratios. As with actual revenue insurance, the simulation structure 
for revenue insurance allows the impact of a low yield (price) draw to be offset by a 
higher than average price (yield) draw, mitigating the size of any potential crop insurance 
payment.  
The loss ratio for crop insurance on the commodities not explicitly included in the 
analysis is derived from its historical relationship with the combined loss ratio for crop 
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insurance on corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, rice, sorghum, barley, and oats. Indemnities 
are then calculated as the product of the premiums and the loss ratios. Crop insurance net 
indemnities equal the sum of indemnities and premium subsidies less insurance 
premiums. 
Nonproduct-specific support is only included in the total current AMS if the sum 
of all nonproduct-specific support is greater than the de minimis level of 5 percent of the 
value of total agricultural production.  For most of the commodities included in the 
model, the value of production is simply defined as price multiplied by production.  For 
beef and pork, the indicator prices in the model are multiplied by carcass-weight meat 
production and then by a calibration factor that generates 2001 estimates equal to those 
reported in the U.S. submission.  For many other commodities, the model follows the 
practice used in the U.S. submission, where calendar year cash receipts for products such 
as fruits, vegetables, and nursery products are used in lieu of a true value of production 
measure.  One case where this choice is particularly important is hay, where only a small 
portion of total production is marketed.  The hay cash receipts used in the value of 
production calculation are therefore much less than the result of multiplying the USDA-
reported levels of hay production and prices. 
The total current AMS includes a number of minor components not endogenous 
in the stochastic model.  For example, the U.S. submission indicates the value of 
irrigation subsidies in 2001 was $300 million, and this was considered part of 
nonproduct-specific support.  The model treats these components as exogenous variables 
that are included in the AMS calculations. 
 
The Stochastic Process 
 The stochastic baseline process begins with the generation of a deterministic 
baseline.  Each November, FAPRI analysts construct a set of preliminary global baseline 
projections using the deterministic model.  Based on reviewer comments and other new 
information, a revised deterministic baseline is prepared in January.   
As discussed, some of the equations in the stochastic model are different than the 
corresponding equations in the deterministic model.  The stochastic model is calibrated 
so that it generates precisely the deterministic estimates when all exogenous variables are 
set at the levels assumed for the deterministic baseline.  Thus, when the means of the 
stochastic baseline differ from the deterministic results, it is because there are non-
linearities in the models, asymmetries in the policies, or because of the luck of the 
random draws, not because the models generate different results for the same set of 
baseline assumptions. 
Considering all the factors that make commodity market outcomes uncertain, 
there is a very large set of variables one could draw from in conducting stochastic 
analysis.  The FAPRI stochastic model draws from a relatively narrow set of exogenous 
variables.  The process involves both “science” and “art.”  Rather than sampling all 
possible sources of uncertainty, an attempt is made to draw from a sufficient number of 
factors to reflect both supply- and demand-side uncertainty so that resulting price and 
quantity distributions appear reasonably consistent with historical observations and 
analyst judgments. 
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In general, the approach is to make correlated random draws from empirical 
distributions of selected exogenous variables and solve the model for each of the 500 sets 
of exogenous variables to generate 500 alternative outcomes for the endogenous 
variables.  Each of the exogenous sets of assumptions and endogenous sets of results are 
preserved, so that it is possible to decompose any given solution, and so that alternative 
policy scenarios can effectively be run against 500 different, but related, baselines. 
Supply-side exogenous variables used to drive the stochastic analysis include crop 
yields, the share of planted area which is harvested, production expenses, and error terms 
from state milk production per cow equations.  Demand-side variables include error 
terms from key domestic consumption, stock, and trade equations.  While it is possible to 
imagine a wide range of other sources of variability (macroeconomic variables, model 
coefficients, etc.), experience has shown that this subset of factors is sufficient to 
generate plausible distributions of prices and quantities. 
In general, the statistical distributions of exogenous variables are based on about 
22 years of annual time series data.  Crop yield distributions, for example, are based on 
deviations from trend yields during the 1983-2004 period.  These deviations and 
corresponding deviations from trend shares of planted area that is harvested are correlated 
across all modeled crops.  For example, drawing a positive deviation from trend corn 
yields means one is likely, but not certain, to also draw a positive deviation from trend 
soybean yields.  Likewise, error terms from demand equations are also correlated.  
Results indicate, for example, that error terms from the reduced-form export demand 
equations for major crops are positively correlated with one another. 
The stochastic draws of exogenous variables are made with SIMETAR, software 
developed by Dr. James Richardson at Texas A&M University.  SIMETAR is capable of 
handling large matrices, but with limited historical observations it is not possible to 
develop reliable estimates of the correlations of all the selected exogenous variables 
together.  Instead, the exogenous variables are grouped on the basis of similarity or 
observed correlation, and the correlation across groups is assumed to be zero; e.g., no 
correlation is assumed between the group containing all crop yield deviations and the 
group of error terms from meat consumer demand equations. 
Given 500 sets of correlated random draws of the selected exogenous variables, 
the stochastic solution is derived by solving the model for each of the 500 sets.  The 
model simulates in SAS, and results are maintained in SAS data sets and written to an 
Excel spreadsheet.  With 500 solutions for 10 years for approximately 1,000 variables, 
the file size of the solution spreadsheet exceeds 100 megabytes.   
It should be stressed that the stochastic process involves significant analyst 
judgment in deciding what variables to consider, methods used to detrend or otherwise 
adjust data, etc.  To get a model to generate 500 sets of “reasonable” outcomes requires a 
robust model and frequent model upkeep and revision.  While many of the model 
parameters are based strictly on econometric results of time series estimations, other 
parameters are based at least in part on analyst judgment.  As argued by Just (2001), it is 
not reasonable to expect time series data to provide all the information needed to build 
models appropriate for policy analysis. 
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Results and Discussion 
Baseline projections prepared in early 2005 indicated modest increases in nominal 
prices for major U.S. field crops between 2006 and 2014 (Table 1).  For all the major 
crops, deterministic baseline prices rise to levels where marketing loan program benefits 
would be small or non-existent, and even CCPs would disappear for many crops.  The 
mean results from the 500 stochastic outcomes suggest similar levels of crop prices.  
Only in the case of rice is the mean of stochastic prices noticeably lower than the 
deterministic estimate. 
Given the asymmetric nature of U.S. farm programs, the estimated variation in 
stochastic results takes on special significance.  For example, even though mean corn 
prices from the stochastic analysis are well above the $1.95 loan rate, the $0.33-$0.38 per 
bushel standard deviation in corn prices is large enough that some of the 500 outcomes 
for corn prices are low enough to generate considerable marketing loan benefits.  It is 
precisely this asymmetry that accounts for some of the differences between deterministic 
baseline prices and the mean prices of the stochastic analysis.  In the case of rice, large 
average stochastic loan program benefits increase average coupled producer returns 
relative to the deterministic estimates, and result in a higher mean level of rice 
production.  The higher mean level of rice production, in turn, contributes to a lower 
mean level of rice prices than in the deterministic baseline.    
For the major field crops, the bulk of the estimated product-specific AMS can be 
attributed to marketing loan program benefits.  The means reported in Table 2 mask a 
wide range of stochastic outcomes.  In most of the 500 stochastic outcomes, for example, 
corn marketing loan benefits are zero in every year after 2006.  In some of the outcomes, 
however, prices are low enough to generate very large marketing loan benefits.  For 
example, in 2010, corn LDPs exceed $3.6 billion in 10 percent of the outcomes. 
At the mean of the stochastic outcomes, dairy and sugar account for more than 
half of the total product-specific AMS.  Once the dairy MILC program expires in 2005, 
the AMS for those two commodities is simply equal to production multiplied by the gap 
between a legislatively-fixed support price and a WTO-fixed world reference price 
(based on 1986-1988 world market prices).   Thus, for dairy and sugar under current U.S. 
policies, the only source of variation in the AMS is production uncertainty.   
In the case of product-specific support, the difference between the calculated 
AMS and the current AMS used to determine compliance with the WTO agreement is 
modest, generally a little over $200 million per year.  The difference is due to the effect 
of the product-specific de minimis rule that excludes from the current AMS product-
specific support that is less than 5 percent of the value of production of the commodity in 
question. 
In contrast, there is a very large difference between the mean calculated 
nonproduct-specific support (primarily CCPs and crop insurance benefits) and the 
proportion included in the mean estimate of the current AMS.  In the vast majority of 
outcomes (over 90 percent of outcomes in 2006 and over 98 percent of outcomes in 
2014), total nonproduct-specific support is less than the de minimis level of 5 percent of 
the value of total agricultural production.  As a result, none of the nonproduct-specific 
support counts toward the current AMS in the majority of possible outcomes.  However, 
in the few cases when nonproduct-specific support exceeds the de minimis level, it is a 
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major component of the estimate of total current AMS.  The mean contribution of less 
than $1 billion in every year after 2006 reflects a very low probability of a very large 
contribution.  
At the mean of the 500 outcomes, the total current AMS declines from about $12 
billion in 2006 to less than $10 billion by 2014.  This estimate is far below the URAA 
limit of $19.1 billion, and would seem to suggest that the United States would face little 
difficulty complying with its URAA commitments, or even with a hypothetical DDA 
agreement that would require significant reductions in the permitted current AMS. 
The means, however, do not tell the whole story.  In 6.0 percent of the outcomes 
for 2006, for example, the product-specific current AMS exceeds the WTO limit, even 
before considering nonproduct-specific support measures.  That share declines to 2.8 
percent by 2014, primarily because projected increases in mean commodity prices reduce 
the likelihood of large marketing loan expenditures.  
In addition to the effects of product-specific support, in 9.6 percent of the 2006 
outcomes, nonproduct-specific support exceeds the de minimis level, and in 12.6 percent, 
the 2006 total current AMS (including both product-specific and nonproduct-specific 
support) exceeds the WTO limit.  The proportion of cases of product-specific and 
nonproduct-specific support exceeding respective triggers cannot always be simply added 
to estimate the proportion of cases where the total current AMS will exceed the WTO 
limit, because some of the outcomes with high levels of product-specific AMS also have 
high levels of nonproduct-specific support.  The share of outcomes where the total 
current AMS exceeds the WTO limit declines from 12.6 percent in 2006 to 4.6 percent by 
2014, under current U.S. policies and URAA commitments.  
The framework also makes it possible to estimate the proportion of outcomes 
where the total current AMS exceeds the URAA commitment levels at least once over the 
nine-year period.  In 41.8 percent of the 500 outcomes, the URAA commitments are 
exceeded at least once between 2006 and 2014.  If the results for individual years were 
independent of one another, the probability of at least one violation of the AMS 
commitments would be 51.8 percent.  The difference suggests that AMS estimates are 
correlated positively across time.  For example, suppose a high stochastic yield draw 
results in low market prices and a large AMS in year t.  High yields in year t are also 
likely to result in large carry-out stocks that increase the likelihood of lower prices and a 
large AMS in year t+1. 
These stochastic results tell a very different story than suggested by deterministic 
analysis (Table 3).  Product-specific current AMS is more than $2 billion per year lower 
in the deterministic analysis than the mean of the 500 stochastic outcomes.  Two crops 
account for most of the difference.  For both corn and soybeans, deterministic baseline 
prices are high enough that marketing loan benefits are small or non-existent, and what 
little support is provided by loan interest rate subsidies is less than the crop-specific de 
minimis level.  In contrast, many of the stochastic outcomes yield sizable marketing loan 
benefits and, consequently, sizable current AMS. 
Nonproduct-specific support is also significantly smaller in the deterministic 
analysis than the mean of the stochastic analysis.  CCPs account for most of the 
difference, but crop insurance benefits also contribute.  The relationship between 
deterministic and stochastic estimates of CCPs depends on baseline prices, and there are 
cases where deterministic estimates of CCPs can be greater than the mean of stochastic 
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outcomes, specifically, where deterministic baseline CCPs are near their maximum 
levels, there will be some stochastic outcomes where CCPs are at less than maximum 
levels.  However, on balance, CCPs are smaller in the deterministic baseline than the 
mean of the stochastic outcomes. 
The deterministic estimate of the total current AMS is actually closer to the 10th 
percentile of the stochastic outcomes than to the mean (Figure 1).  In the deterministic 
analysis, the current AMS for several crops is zero in most or all years, so the total 
current AMS is only slightly larger than the AMS for dairy and sugar.  The same occurs 
in most of the stochastic outcomes as well.  In a substantial minority of the stochastic 
outcomes, however, marketing loan benefits, CCPs, and/or crop insurance benefits are 
large, contributing to a skewed distribution of total current AMS. 
Sorting the stochastic results for 2006 illustrates the factors that contribute to the 
cases where WTO triggers are exceeded (Table 4).  In the 6.0 percent of outcomes where 
product-specific support exceeds the AMS limit, the average corn and cotton prices are 
far lower than in the other 94.0 percent of outcomes, and these low prices can largely be 
attributed to above-average yields.   In one-third of the cases where product-specific 
support exceeds the AMS limit, nonproduct-specific support also exceeds the de minimis 
level, as above-average CCPs and below-average value of production more than offset 
the impact of below average crop insurance benefits. 
The 9.6 percent of 2006 outcomes where nonproduct-specific support exceeds the 
de minimis level suggests a very different pattern.   In particular, crop insurance benefits 
far exceed their average levels, as corn and cotton yields and corn and cotton prices are 
all below their mean values.  Normally, one would expect prices and yields to be 
inversely related, and that is indeed the more common relationship in the stochastic 
outcomes.  However, there can be cases where large carry-in stocks and/or weak demand 
can result in below-average prices in spite of below-average yields.  Such cases are 
relatively rare, but they do occur often enough to play a major factor in determining the 
share of outcomes that exceed AMS commitments.    
To the extent these results are plausible, it illustrates the importance of drawing 
on both supply and demand side exogenous variables in doing stochastic analysis.  If only 
supply side variables were drawn, downward-sloping demand curves would ensure a 
negative relationship between price and yields would hold in almost all cases (carry-in 
stocks could cause a few exceptions).  Many of the cases where the nonproduct-specific 
support level exceeds the de minimis level could never have occurred if only supply side 
variables were considered, as there would be very few outcomes where production and 
prices would simultaneously be below mean levels. 
When aggregating across all the outcomes where AMS commitments are 
exceeded, corn and cotton yields are near mean levels.  The outcomes where high yields 
result in low prices, large marketing loan benefits, and a large product-specific AMS are 
offset by the cases where below-average yields and low prices result in high crop 
insurance expenditures and a large level of non-commodity specific support.   
The value of agricultural production is systematically lower in the outcomes 
where the various WTO triggers are exceeded than in other outcomes.  This suggests that 
in estimating the critical level of nonproduct-specific support it is not adequate to take 5 
percent of the deterministic value of production or even 5 percent of the stochastic mean 
of the value of production.   
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute — 16 — FAPRI Policy Working Paper #01-05 
As this is written, the shape of any eventual DDA agreement remains unclear.  
For purposes of illustration, consider a hypothetical agreement that would reduce the 
AMS limit in 10 percent increments until the 2011 limit equals 50 percent of the limit in 
2006 but keep all other accounting rules the same as assumed in generating the other 
estimates (Table 5).  Under current U.S. farm policies, the proportion of outcomes 
exceeding the hypothetical AMS limit would increase quickly, reaching almost 38 
percent in 2011 before declining slightly in later years.  The relationship between these 
estimates and U.S. policy changes remains uncertain, but the probability of policy change 
seems much higher at the lower AMS limit.   
Results from assuming alternative levels of hypothetical reductions in AMS limits 
demonstrate the nonlinearity of the estimates.  For example, 23 percent of outcomes 
exceed a 2011 AMS limit set 40 percent lower than the current limit, but 100 percent 
exceed a 2011 limit that is set 70 percent lower than the current limit.  This occurs 
primarily because the AMS for dairy and sugar are largely predetermined under current 
policy.  Dairy and sugar account for more than $6 billion in AMS at the mean, and only 
production variability can change the estimate unless policies are altered.  
If CCPs are included in measures of nonproduct-specific support, the likelihood 
of exceeding the de minimis trigger increases dramatically when the trigger is reduced 
below the current 5 percent.  If, on the other hand, CCPs are excluded from the 
nonproduct-specific category, the share of outcomes where crop insurance and the other 
minor components of nonproduct-specific support exceed the de minimis level is low 
unless the trigger is lowered below 3 percent of the value of production. 
Under one interpretation of the 2004 WTO framework agreement (WTO 2004), 
CCPs would be shifted out of the amber box to a redefined blue box that would be 
limited to 5 percent of the value of production.  Given current program provisions, it is 
mathematically impossible for CCPs to exceed $8 billion, and in none of the stochastic 
results does the value of agricultural production fall below $160 billion.  Only if the 
proposed blue box limit were reduced to less than 4 percent of the value of production 
does the stochastic model estimate any probability of exceeding the limit under current 
U.S. policies.  Note that these estimates are contingent on the value of production being 
based on current market outcomes; if the value of production is based on some historical 
level, the results could be significantly different (in general, the value of production has 
increased over time, so using an historical value of production would tend to increase the 
proportion of outcomes exceeding hypothetical limits, all else equal).   
Finally, the framework agreement and recent negotiations suggest the possibility 
of limits on AMS for particular products.  How any such limits would be set is uncertain 
at this writing, but suppose the limits were set at some percentage of 1999-2001 average 
levels of reported current AMS for each commodity.  Stochastic model results suggest 
that almost any plausible limit would have a significant chance of being exceeded under 
current U.S. policies (Table 6).   For example, even if a commodity-specific limit were 
set at 150 percent of the 1999-2001 current AMS level, in 20.4 percent of outcomes the 
limit would be exceeded for corn in 2006 and in 13.0 percent in 2014.  At lower 
commodity-specific limits, the proportion of outcomes exceeding the limit increases, but 
perhaps less than might have been anticipated.  This occurs because in any given year, 
the most likely outcome is that prices will be high enough that marketing loan benefits 
and thus the product-specific AMS will be near zero. 
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The consequences of the hypothetical product-specific limits are very different for 
different commodities.  For example, the hypothetical limits are especially large for 
soybeans, in part because special oilseed payments made in the 1999-2001 period were 
classified as product-specific support, while market loss assistance payments made to 
grain and cotton producers were classified as nonproduct-specific.  With a higher base, 
the proportion of outcomes where the soybean AMS would exceed the hypothetical limit 
is much smaller than the corresponding proportions for corn. 
Given the nature of the AMS calculations for dairy, in almost all outcomes even a 
modest reduction in a product-specific limit would be exceeded without a change in 
policy.  With rising milk production over time, even setting the limit at 100 percent of the 
1999-2001 current AMS would be almost certain to require a policy change. 
Concluding Remarks 
For many policy questions, traditional point estimates often miss the point.  Many 
government policies have asymmetric features, so a deterministic point estimate may 
differ systematically from the mean of possible outcomes.  Furthermore, there are many 
times where there is interest in the tails of distributions, such as policies that provide 
support only when abnormal events occur.  Both of these concerns are important in 
examining the potential impacts of any agreement to establish new WTO disciplines on 
internal support measures. 
The stochastic results detailed here illustrate the value of a model that can 
generate a range of possible outcomes rather than a single set of point estimates.  
Deterministic analysis suggests that projected U.S. support to producers as measured by 
the current AMS is well below the levels permitted under the URAA.  Stochastic analysis 
reveals that the mean of possible AMS outcomes exceeds the deterministic level by 
several billion dollars per year, and that in 41.8 percent of the outcomes, the URAA 
limits would be exceeded at least once over the period between 2006 and 2014 if current 
rules and policies remained in place.  While deterministic analysis would suggest that 
even a large reduction in AMS limits need have no effect on U.S. farm policy, stochastic 
analysis suggests that even a modest reduction in AMS limits could significantly increase 
the probability that limits will be exceeded in any given year.  Commodity-specific limits 
are particularly likely to prove an issue for current U.S. farm policy. 
The estimates reported here should be treated with caution.  Stochastic analysis 
remains as much an art as a science, and future model developments will yield different 
results.  Furthermore, stochastic analysis does not eliminate the problem of baseline 
dependence of scenario results.  If deterministic baseline prices were higher (lower) than 
reported here, the proportion of outcomes that exceed various WTO limits would be 
lower (higher) than indicated in the tables.  The results should be used to identify 
potential issues, but should not be considered definitive to the third (or even first) 
decimal place.
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Table 1.  Deterministic and stochastic baseline crop price projections
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Corn (dollars per bushel)
   Deterministic 2.19 2.22 2.23 2.26 2.28 2.30 2.32 2.32 2.33
   Stochastic mean 2.18 2.21 2.22 2.25 2.27 2.29 2.31 2.32 2.32
   Stochastic standard deviation 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38
Soybeans
   Deterministic 4.99 5.27 5.41 5.42 5.43 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.43
   Stochastic mean 5.01 5.24 5.37 5.41 5.42 5.42 5.41 5.41 5.43
   Stochastic standard deviation 0.89 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.88
Wheat
   Deterministic 3.24 3.31 3.36 3.42 3.47 3.51 3.56 3.60 3.63
   Stochastic mean 3.24 3.30 3.35 3.41 3.46 3.50 3.55 3.60 3.63
   Stochastic standard deviation 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.42
Upland cotton (dollars per pound)
   Deterministic 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.55
   Stochastic mean 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.54
   Stochastic standard deviation 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Rice (dollars per hundredweight)
   Deterministic 6.98 7.26 7.42 7.58 7.73 7.89 8.09 8.27 8.41
   Stochastic mean 6.98 7.25 7.34 7.46 7.58 7.69 7.84 7.95 8.06
   Stochastic standard deviation 1.36 1.42 1.50 1.51 1.46 1.62 1.64 1.72 1.77
Note: Projections were prepared in January-February 2005 based on available market information and an assumed 
continuation of existing agricultural policies.  
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Table 2.  AMS calculations, mean of 500 stochastic outcomes
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
(million dollars)
Product-specific calculated AMS 11,228 10,863 10,705 10,200 9,979 9,949 9,925 9,790 9,790
Product-specific current AMS 11,018 10,660 10,483 9,983 9,746 9,724 9,703 9,555 9,581
   Barley 42 41 46 43 44 41 40 37 34
   Corn 1,340 1,351 1,361 1,190 1,067 993 936 915 951
   Cotton (upland) 1,452 1,474 1,409 1,253 1,162 1,167 1,151 1,086 1,014
   Dairy 4,740 4,788 4,832 4,870 4,909 4,947 4,986 5,030 5,074
   Minor oilseeds 14 12 13 11 9 11 14 12 14
   Oats 13 11 12 9 8 8 7 7 7
   Peanuts 21 23 24 25 22 25 25 26 23
   Rice 341 295 288 271 248 257 239 230 209
   Sorghum 104 97 94 83 72 60 50 44 41
   Soybeans 1,407 1,037 910 740 739 775 825 739 770
   Sugar 1,285 1,311 1,275 1,290 1,285 1,288 1,291 1,298 1,307
   Wheat 158 120 117 99 82 53 40 32 37
   All other 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Nonproduct-specific calc. AMS 7,436 7,275 7,299 7,049 6,992 6,812 6,720 6,561 6,474
   Countercyclical payments 4,254 4,019 3,905 3,639 3,481 3,282 3,147 2,942 2,822
   Crop insurance 2,764 2,839 2,977 2,993 3,093 3,112 3,155 3,201 3,234
   All other 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418
Value of agricultural production 210,633 214,229 218,115 222,249 225,124 227,876 231,139 235,995 240,833
(5% de minimis trigger) 10,532 10,711 10,906 11,112 11,256 11,394 11,557 11,800 12,042
Nonproduct-specific support
included in current AMS 1,056 958 696 594 487 432 272 282 221
Total current AMS 12,073 11,618 11,179 10,578 10,234 10,156 9,975 9,838 9,802
URAA current AMS limit 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103
Proportion of outcomes where:
   Product-specific current AMS
   exceeds AMS limit 6.0% 4.0% 4.2% 3.8% 2.2% 1.8% 3.4% 2.8% 2.8%
   Nonproduct-specific calculated
   AMS exceeds de minimis 5% 9.6% 8.4% 6.2% 5.2% 4.0% 3.6% 2.4% 2.4% 1.8%
   Total current AMS exceeds
   AMS limit 12.6% 12.0% 10.0% 8.4% 6.0% 5.4% 5.6% 5.0% 4.6%
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Table 3.  Deterministic and stochastic AMS calculations
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Product-specific calculated AMS (million dollars)
   Deterministic 8,626 8,094 7,979 7,796 7,682 7,673 7,645 7,563 7,414
   Stochastic mean 11,228 10,863 10,705 10,200 9,979 9,949 9,925 9,790 9,790
   Difference 2,602 2,769 2,726 2,403 2,298 2,276 2,279 2,227 2,375
Product-specific current AMS
   Deterministic 7,937 7,950 7,798 7,628 7,522 7,523 7,500 7,354 7,268
   Stochastic mean 11,018 10,660 10,483 9,983 9,746 9,724 9,703 9,555 9,581
   Difference 3,081 2,710 2,686 2,356 2,225 2,201 2,202 2,201 2,314
(Corn current AMS)
   Deterministic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Stochastic mean 1,340 1,351 1,361 1,190 1,067 993 936 915 951
   Difference 1,340 1,351 1,361 1,190 1,067 993 936 915 951
(Soybean current AMS)
   Deterministic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Stochastic mean 1,407 1,037 910 740 739 775 825 739 770
   Difference 1,407 1,037 910 740 739 775 825 739 770
(Other product-spec. current AMS)
   Deterministic 7,937 7,950 7,798 7,628 7,522 7,523 7,500 7,354 7,268
   Stochastic mean 8,270 8,272 8,211 8,054 7,941 7,956 7,942 7,902 7,860
   Difference 334 322 414 426 419 433 442 547 592
Nonproduct-specific calc. AMS
   Deterministic 6,732 5,920 5,605 5,264 5,106 4,872 4,719 4,574 4,406
   Stochastic mean 7,436 7,275 7,299 7,049 6,992 6,812 6,720 6,561 6,474
   Difference 704 1,355 1,694 1,785 1,885 1,940 2,001 1,987 2,067
(Countercyclical payments)
   Deterministic 4,104 3,222 2,856 2,463 2,267 1,993 1,794 1,613 1,414
   Stochastic mean 4,254 4,019 3,905 3,639 3,481 3,282 3,147 2,942 2,822
   Difference 151 797 1,049 1,175 1,214 1,289 1,353 1,329 1,408
Nonproduct-specific support
included in current AMS
   Deterministic 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
   Stochastic mean 1,056 958 696 594 487 432 272 282 221
   Difference 1,056 958 696 594 487 432 272 282 221
Total current AMS
   Deterministic 7,937 7,950 7,798 7,628 7,522 7,523 7,500 7,354 7,268
   Stochastic mean 12,073 11,618 11,179 10,578 10,234 10,156 9,975 9,838 9,802
   Difference 4,137 3,668 3,382 2,950 2,712 2,633 2,474 2,483 2,534
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Table 4.  Sorted stochastic results for 2006
Mean Product-spec. current Non-product-specific Total current
of 500 AMS > AMS limit support > de minimis AMS > AMS limit
outcomes No Yes No Yes No Yes
(million dollars)
Product-specific current AMS 11,018 10,338 21,589 10,670 14,238 10,140 17,069
Calculated nonproduct-specific 7,436 7,343 8,879 7,057 10,997 7,053 10,085
Total current AMS 12,073 11,234 25,121 10,670 25,235 10,261 24,608
Counter-cyclical payments 4,254 4,073 7,103 4,041 6,262 3,909 6,656
Crop insurance contribution 2,764 2,852 1,358 2,598 4,318 2,727 3,011
Value of agricultural production 210,633 211,267 200,684 211,514 202,322 211,929 201,629
(bushels per acre)
Corn yield 148.0 147.3 159.1 148.7 142.0 147.8 149.4
(pounds per acre)
Upland cotton yield 714 711 754 716 697 713 722
(dollars per bushel)
Corn price 2.18 2.22 1.65 2.21 1.90 2.24 1.80
(dollars per pound)
Upland cotton price 0.456 0.461 0.378 0.461 0.406 0.464 0.395
Proportion where product-specific
  support exceeds AMS limit 6.0% 0.0% 100.0% 4.4% 20.8% 0.0% 47.6%
Proportion where nonproduct-specific 
   support exceeds de minimis 9.6% 8.1% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 1.1% 68.3%
Proportion where total current
   AMS exceeds AMS limit 12.6% 7.0% 100.0% 4.4% 89.6% 0.0% 100.0%
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Table 5.  Proportion of outcomes exceeding alternative AMS limits
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
(million dollars)
URAA Current AMS limit 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103 19,103
Proportion where:
   Product-specific > AMS limit 6.0% 4.0% 4.2% 3.8% 2.2% 1.8% 3.4% 2.8% 2.8%
   Nonproduct-specific > de minimis 9.6% 8.4% 6.2% 5.2% 4.0% 3.6% 2.4% 2.4% 1.8%
   Total current AMS > AMS limit 12.6% 12.0% 10.0% 8.4% 6.0% 5.4% 5.6% 5.0% 4.6%
Hypothetical AMS limit: 50% lower (million dollars)
by 2011, keeping other rules 19,103 17,193 15,283 13,372 11,462 9,552 9,552 9,552 9,552
Proportion where:
   Product-specific > AMS limit 6.0% 8.2% 14.6% 17.0% 23.0% 37.6% 33.8% 31.2% 31.6%
   Nonproduct-specific > de minimis 9.6% 8.4% 6.2% 5.2% 4.0% 3.6% 2.4% 2.4% 1.8%
   Total current AMS > AMS limit 12.6% 15.4% 18.4% 20.0% 24.0% 37.8% 33.8% 31.8% 31.6%
Proportion where product-specific
current AMS > AMS limit if:
   Limit unchanged ($19.103 bil.) 6.0% 4.0% 4.2% 3.8% 2.2% 1.8% 3.4% 2.8% 2.8%
   Limit reduced 10% ($17.193 bil.) 10.6% 8.2% 7.8% 6.2% 5.8% 4.2% 5.2% 5.4% 5.2%
   Limit reduced 20% ($15.283 bil.) 18.2% 13.4% 14.6% 8.8% 9.2% 8.0% 7.6% 8.8% 8.0%
   Limit reduced 30% ($13.372 bil.) 24.8% 22.6% 21.4% 17.0% 14.8% 14.2% 13.4% 13.0% 13.4%
   Limit reduced 40% ($11.462 bil.) 33.2% 35.2% 29.4% 26.6% 23.0% 23.0% 22.4% 21.0% 20.0%
   Limit reduced 50% ($9.552 bil.) 49.0% 45.8% 43.8% 39.4% 36.2% 37.6% 33.8% 31.2% 31.6%
   Limit reduced 60% ($7.641 bil.) 77.6% 74.2% 72.2% 67.2% 63.0% 67.0% 66.4% 60.8% 61.8%
   Limit reduced 70% ($5.731 bil.) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Proportion where nonproduct-
specific support > de minimis if:
   CCPs included; de minimis=5% 9.6% 8.4% 6.2% 5.2% 4.0% 3.6% 2.4% 2.4% 1.8%
   CCPs included; de minimis=4% 33.2% 30.6% 27.6% 23.4% 20.8% 18.6% 13.8% 12.2% 11.4%
   CCPs included; de minimis=3% 70.8% 64.0% 63.4% 58.0% 54.4% 48.6% 49.4% 43.0% 38.4%
   CCPs included; de minimis=2% 92.6% 89.4% 90.4% 83.6% 85.8% 81.0% 81.6% 77.2% 72.4%
   CCPs excluded; de minimis=5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
   CCPs excluded; de minimis=4% 0.2% 0.4% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0%
   CCPs excluded; de minimis=3% 9.0% 8.0% 8.6% 8.0% 8.4% 9.4% 8.2% 8.6% 6.6%
   CCPs excluded; de minimis=2% 28.0% 29.0% 29.2% 28.8% 30.2% 28.4% 30.0% 29.0% 28.0%
Proportion where CCPs exceed
hypothetical blue box limit if limit is:
   5% of value of production 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
   4% of value of production 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
   3% of value of production 25.4% 20.8% 18.2% 13.6% 11.2% 8.4% 6.0% 4.0% 3.8%
   2% of value of production 50.6% 45.6% 42.0% 37.2% 35.6% 32.6% 28.0% 23.8% 22.6%
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Table 6.  Proportion of outcomes exceeding hypothetical product-specific AMS limits
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Corn
150% of 1999-2001 avg. ($3,291 mil.) 20.4% 18.4% 18.4% 16.0% 14.0% 13.2% 12.2% 13.4% 13.0%
100% of 1999-2001 avg. ($2,194 mil.) 28.2% 28.6% 27.4% 24.0% 21.2% 20.6% 19.0% 17.0% 18.6%
75% of 1999-2001 avg. ($1,646 mil.) 31.4% 34.0% 31.6% 27.8% 26.6% 25.2% 22.8% 20.4% 22.2%
50% of 1999-2001 avg. ($1,097 mil.) 36.4% 39.0% 36.4% 32.4% 31.2% 29.2% 26.6% 23.0% 24.4%
25% of 1999-2001 avg. ($549 mil.) 42.8% 43.0% 42.8% 37.2% 37.6% 32.0% 30.6% 29.4% 28.8%
Soybeans
150% of 1999-2001 avg. ($5,037 mil.) 4.0% 1.8% 2.2% 1.0% 0.6% 1.2% 1.4% 0.8% 2.4%
100% of 1999-2001 avg. ($3,358 mil.) 15.4% 11.4% 8.4% 7.0% 6.6% 5.2% 7.4% 5.8% 6.2%
75% of 1999-2001 avg. ($2,519 mil.) 22.6% 19.0% 14.6% 12.2% 11.8% 11.4% 15.0% 13.2% 12.2%
50% of 1999-2001 avg. ($1,679 mil.) 38.0% 26.8% 25.0% 19.0% 20.6% 21.6% 23.0% 20.2% 20.6%
25% of 1999-2001 avg. ($840 mil.) 50.8% 38.0% 33.4% 29.6% 28.8% 32.0% 31.4% 29.8% 31.2%
Wheat
150% of 1999-2001 avg. ($911 mil.) 7.0% 6.0% 5.6% 3.8% 3.8% 1.2% 0.8% 1.0% 1.8%
100% of 1999-2001 avg. ($607 mil.) 12.2% 9.2% 9.0% 7.0% 6.4% 3.6% 3.4% 2.2% 2.4%
75% of 1999-2001 avg. ($455 mil.) 15.2% 11.6% 11.8% 9.6% 8.2% 5.2% 5.0% 3.4% 3.8%
50% of 1999-2001 avg. ($304 mil.) 18.6% 14.4% 13.8% 12.8% 9.4% 7.8% 6.0% 4.4% 4.4%
25% of 1999-2001 avg. ($152 mil.) 24.2% 19.6% 18.6% 16.0% 13.6% 11.2% 8.6% 6.8% 6.8%
Cotton
150% of 1999-2001 avg. ($3,107 mil.) 1.0% 0.6% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6%
100% of 1999-2001 avg. ($2,071 mil.) 18.8% 20.4% 20.0% 14.6% 12.4% 12.4% 11.6% 9.8% 10.2%
75% of 1999-2001 avg. ($1,553 mil.) 41.4% 45.0% 41.8% 34.2% 28.4% 29.2% 26.6% 24.4% 22.2%
50% of 1999-2001 avg. ($1,036 mil.) 68.0% 68.8% 65.4% 54.8% 49.6% 49.0% 48.8% 44.0% 39.2%
25% of 1999-2001 avg. ($518 mil.) 94.2% 91.8% 88.0% 81.4% 73.8% 74.8% 77.2% 72.2% 63.4%
Rice
150% of 1999-2001 avg. ($911 mil.) 6.2% 5.0% 5.4% 4.6% 3.2% 5.2% 4.4% 4.2% 2.6%
100% of 1999-2001 avg. ($607 mil.) 27.4% 23.4% 23.6% 21.8% 21.0% 20.6% 20.0% 19.2% 18.4%
75% of 1999-2001 avg. ($455 mil.) 34.6% 30.0% 29.4% 27.6% 26.4% 26.6% 25.0% 23.4% 24.0%
50% of 1999-2001 avg. ($304 mil.) 43.6% 39.4% 36.6% 33.6% 31.0% 32.2% 29.4% 29.4% 26.6%
25% of 1999-2001 avg. ($152 mil.) 57.4% 51.0% 51.2% 49.0% 44.6% 45.0% 41.8% 39.6% 35.2%
Dairy
150% of 1999-2001 avg. ($7,107 mil.) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
100% of 1999-2001 avg. ($4,738 mil.) 54.4% 69.8% 82.6% 90.2% 95.4% 97.8% 99.4% 99.6% 100.0%
75% of 1999-2001 avg. ($3,554 mil.) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
50% of 1999-2001 avg. ($2,369 mil.) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
25% of 1999-2001 avg. ($1,185 mil.) 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Note: Figures assume the commodity-specific de minimis rule is eliminated.  With the existing de minimis rule, the
current AMS would be zero whenever the calculated AMS is less than 5% of the value of production.   
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Figure 1. Deterministic and stochastic estimates of total current AMS 
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